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MEMORANDUM FOR:

The attached was requested by The Honorable
Lionel Olmer, Under Secretary for International
Trade at Commerce. Prepared by
EUR/A/EE/CE.

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Date *12 Oct 83*

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Lionel Olmer
Under Secretary for
International Trade
Department of Commerce

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SUBJECT: Romanian Foreign Policy
Independence

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Enclosed is our response to the questions
you raised [redacted]
Please let us know if you have any further
questions on the subject.

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John N. McMahon

Enclosure
As Stated

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[redacted]

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EVRM 83-10244

[redacted]

12 October 1983

Romania's Maverick Foreign Policy

Summary

The independent Romanian stance

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[redacted] is consonant with the maverick foreign policy Bucharest has been pursuing for the past two decades. Since defying Soviet attempts in the early 1960s to impose tight controls over the East European economies, Romania has consistently resisted pressure for further integration into the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. By doing so, Bucharest has hindered Soviet efforts to expand the use of those organizations as instruments of control not only over Romania, but also over the other Soviet client states in Eastern Europe. The Romanians also have taken independent positions on foreign policy issues important to the USSR and have disputed the Soviets on ideological issues--such as Moscow's claim to leadership of the world Communist movement. Western support or economic assistance can make it easier for Romania to pursue these independent foreign policies, but is unlikely to lead to significantly greater independent behavior by the Romanians.

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Romania's lack of cooperation in Warsaw Pact affairs has probably been the most disturbing aspect of its independent approach for the Soviets. Bucharest has not allowed Warsaw Pact exercises on its territory since 1962 and has sent only token representation to such exercises elsewhere. In 1968, Romania not only refused to participate in--and strongly denounced--the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, but also made clear its readiness to resist militarily any similar move against it. More recently, Romania defied Soviet moves in 1978

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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to increase Pact defense spending and to centralize control of the armed forces of the Pact countries. This year, Bucharest has again resisted Soviet pressures to boost defense spending and has been [redacted]

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[redacted] the primary obstacle to Soviet efforts to obtain a joint Warsaw Pact endorsement of countermeasures to NATO deployment of INF. [redacted]

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The Romanians have also been a disruptive force within CEMA. They have stubbornly resisted Soviet moves to give the organization supranational powers over decisionmaking and planning within member states. Although worsening economic problems have led Romania recently to become more cooperative in a so far unsuccessful effort to obtain more Soviet raw materials and energy supplies, Bucharest continues to resist Soviet pressures for increased economic integration, according to Embassy reporting. Such resistance appears to have contributed to the postponement earlier this year of the Soviet-proposed CEMA summit. [redacted]

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Romania's independent stance within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA probably receives mixed reviews from other East European countries. Its strong opposition to Soviet pressures on various issues has reportedly encouraged others, such as Hungary, to express their own misgivings. [redacted]

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[redacted] More orthodox East Europeans who favor closer bloc cooperation, such as the Czechoslovaks, resent what they consider Romanian obstructionism, [redacted]

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Romania's deviation on a number of important international issues has embarrassed the Soviets and probably reduced Moscow's ability to mobilize non-bloc support for its positions. Bucharest's defiant moves include its pursuit of close ties with China, refusal to associate itself with anti-Chinese statements by its Warsaw Pact allies, and indirect criticism of the Soviet move into Afghanistan. Its flouting of the bloc position also included maintenance of diplomatic relations with Israel following the 1967 war, independent initiatives to break the Middle East deadlock and condemnation of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The Romanians also have frequently diverged from the Soviet line in various international forums, including the United Nations and the CSCE talks. They reportedly angered the Soviets a few days ago by circulating at the UN a draft resolution that appears to take a

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neutral stance between the Soviet and US positions on INF deployment.

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On the ideological front, Romania's opposition to Soviet efforts to regain hegemony over the world Communist movement, as well as its general obstinacy on inter-party and doctrinal matters, has frequently put it at loggerheads with the USSR. The Romanians attended the Soviet-sponsored European Conference of Communist Parties in 1976 only after long, acrimonious negotiations in which they won--in cooperation with the Yugoslavs and various Eurocommunist parties--Soviet acceptance of the principles of non-interference and the equality and autonomy of all Communist parties. We also believe that they boycotted a similar meeting in 1980 because it appeared designed largely to marshal support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to isolate dissident parties that were opposed to it, such as the Italian and the Spanish. The Romanians and the Soviets have also exchanged polemics--most recently this spring--on strictly ideological questions, particularly the nationalist element in Romanian doctrine.

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Despite Bucharest's sometimes wayward behavior, however, Romania remains a repressive, authoritarian Communist state and shares many beliefs and practices with the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries that are antagonistic to Western values and interests. We also believe that President Ceausescu perceives limits to his country's independent behavior imposed by geopolitical considerations, including Romania's 830-mile border with the USSR, its membership in the Warsaw Pact, and its reliance on the USSR for significant economic inputs such as iron ore and coking coal. As a result, the Romanians have been--and in our view will continue to be--very careful not to threaten Soviet security interests. The Romanians often try to placate the USSR in areas where their sovereignty is not threatened, and have been particularly intent on doing this since the onset of their economic crisis four years ago. Their publicly stated willingness since 1980 to participate in CEMA cooperation projects and their advocacy of a political settlement in Afghanistan that would not harm Soviet interests there a few months after their initial expression of unhappiness with the Soviet invasion are cases in point. The Romanians have, however, avoided any accommodations that would significantly increase Moscow's leverage.

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The West can strengthen Romania's ability and will to resist Soviet pressures, which appear to have increased since Andropov took power, through such means as frequent high-level contacts and economic assistance. The likelihood that such

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actions would induce significantly greater independent behavior by Romania is small, however, because of the geopolitical constraints and the probability that the Romanians--under President Ceausescu, at least--will not undertake the necessary reforms of their rigid, Stalinistic system to be able to gain real economic independence. The Romanians, moreover, strongly resent any perceived interference in their internal affairs from the West as well as from the East, as is evident by Ceausescu's pique over criticism of Bucharest's human rights record at MFN hearings in Washington last year, and his anger over economic measures recommended by an IMF team earlier this year. They are unlikely to change their policies in ways that would please the West, such as by liberalizing their internal rule or by ceasing their support of anti-US "national liberation movements" abroad, no matter how much assistance they are given.

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